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SPEAKING BRIEFLY: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
& HISTORIC PRESERVATION
J. Graham Corriher*
"Charges filed after underwear removed"' read the headline of
The Salisbury Post in late July 2010. The cryptic title exposed the public
to a controversy within the local art community that had played out the
preceding week. Clyde, 2 the owner of a local art gallery, had taped a pair
of white double extra-large men's briefs3 to the window of his gallery in
protest of his neighbor, Robert Crum, the owner of the adjacent gallery.
The two had been in a dispute over the ownership rights to an alley
separating their buildings. Clyde, who used the alley as a means of
access to his gallery, was upset at Crum for erecting a decorative fence
and installing other ornamental objects, effectively prohibiting Clyde
from using the alley.4 What the underwear protest was explicitly meant
to say is surely debatable, but it clearly meant to convey Clyde's
displeasure at his neighbor's action.
Late one night,5 several days after the underwear was displayed,
Anne Cave, director of the Rowan Arts Council6 and close friend of
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
1. Shelley Smith, Charges filed after underwear removed, SALISBURY POST,
July 31, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Crime/073110-Cops-
Underwear-Art-clyde-qcd.
2. Previously known as Clyde Overcash, Clyde legally dispensed with his last
name and now is "just Clyde." Interview with Clyde, Owner and Operator, Off
Main Art Gallery and the Salisbury Confederate Civil War Prison in Salisbury, N.C.
(Aug. 25, 2010).
3. To be sure, Clyde never wore the briefs; they were purchased solely for use
in the protest piece. Id.
4. Interview with Clyde, Owner and Operator, Off Main Art Gallery and the
Salisbury Confederate Civil War Prison in Salisbury, N.C. (Nov. 1, 2010); Notes
from District 19C Courtroom I (Nov. 1, 2010) (on file with author).
5. Notes from Courtroom, supra note 4.
6. Anne Cave has since resigned from her position as director. Scott Jenkins,
Art council leader at forefront of Clyde underwear episode resigns, SALISBURY
POST, Feb. 10, 2011, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/02 1011-anne-
cave-resigns-qcd. The Rowan Arts Council is a body designated by the County
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Robert Crum, removed the underwear from Clyde's window. After
unsuccessfully demanding that the underwear be returned, Clyde went to
the magistrate's office and swore out a criminal complaint alleging the
larceny of the briefs by Ms. Cave.9 The provocative incident created a
frenzy of editorials,1o letters to the editor," and Salisbury Post articles.12
Commissioners to promote art in the community. One of the responsibilities of the
Council is to distribute state grants. Rowan Arts Council Home Page,
http://www.rowanarts.org/index.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
7. See Interview with Clyde (Aug 25, 2010), supra note 2; Notes from
Courtroom, supra note 4.
8. Notes from Courtroom, supra note 4.
9. See Smith, Charges filed after underwear removed, supra note 1. In North
Carolina, any judge, magistrate, or clerk of court can issue a warrant for arrest as
long as the warrant is supported by probable cause and the circumstances of the
offense are relayed to the issuing official by affidavit, oath, or affirmation. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-304 (2009). Private citizens may seek a warrant from one of these
officials for wrongs done to them.
10. See Kent Bernhardt, The Great Underwear War, SALISBURY POST, Sept.
19, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Lifestyle/091910-Kent-
Bernhardt-column-qcd; Editorial, The case of the purloined underpants, SALISBURY
PosT, Aug. 3, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Opinion/080310-
edit-debriefed-qcd.
11. See Letter to the Editor, A matter of taste, SALISBURY PosT, Aug. 2, 2010,
available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Opinion/080210-letters-mon-qcd; Letter
to the Editor, Underwear, art & legal abuse, SALISBURY POST, Aug. 4, 2010,
available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Opinion/080410-letters-wednesday-qcd;
Letter to the Editor, Underwear gender gap: Can art be pink and purple?,
SALISBURY POST, Aug.17, 2010, available at
http://www.salisburypost.com/Opinion/08171 0-letters-tuesday-qcd.
12. See Emily Ford, Clyde channels Blackmer display years ago, SALISBURY
POST, Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/081510-art-
What-is-art-Blackmer-sidebar-qcd; Emily Ford, More than underwear at heart of art
discussions, SALISBURY POST, Aug. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.salisburypost.com/News/081510-art-What-is-art-main-story-qcd; Emily
Ford, Talks on art coincide with play, latest escapades, SALISBURY POST, Aug. 15,
2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/08151 0-art-What-is-art-
discussion-group-qcd; Emily Ford, Panel says no to Clyde's underwear sign,
SALISBURY POST, Sept. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.salisburypost.com/News/091110-Underwear-alley-sign-must-go-but-
Clyde-to-appeal-qcd; Sarah Hall, Art, and news, is in the mind of the beholder,
SALISBURY POST, Aug. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.salisburypost.com/Lifestyle/08151 0-art-in-the-mind-of-beholder-qcd;
Shelley Smith, Underwear art debate leads to larceny charge, SALISBURY POST,
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After the charges had been filed, Clyde erected a new, more
elaborate display: a clothesline that stretched the length of the alley from
which he hung more men's underwear, from boxers to briefs to boxer-
briefs. 3 Whatever the initial pair of underwear was meant to convey, the
new display aimed to say it louder. To direct passersby to his display,
Clyde fashioned a sign emblazoned with the title of his newest creation,
"Underwear Alley," from paper, permanent markers, twine, and duct
tape. 14 Above the sign, he attached another pair of white double-extra
large men's briefs to a flagpole. Shortly after erecting the sign, Clyde
received a complaint from the city zoning administrator, who explained
that since his gallery was within a historic district, his sign was in
violation of the city zoning ordinance because he had failed to obtain a
certificate of appropriateness (COA) from the Salisbury Historic
Preservation Commission (HPC). 5 Clyde suspected his neighbor,
July 30, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/073010-web-
underwear-art-qcd; Underwear caper case continued, SALISBURY POST, Aug. 26,
2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/Crime/082610-Underwear-case-
continued-qcd.
13. According to Clyde, only men's underwear sent the appropriate message.
See Letter to the Editor, A matter of taste, supra note 11; Letter to the Editor,
Underwear, art & legal abuse, supra note 11; Letter to the Editor, Underwear
gender gap: Can art be pink and purple?, supra note 11.
14. The sign at issue is a piece of 8-by- 1l-inch white paper. At the top of the
sign is painted an upside-down heart-shaped wreath. Protruding from the tops of the
heart-shaped wreath and connecting the two "chambers" is a rainbow made of
various shades of highlighters. The design was formerly stationery of some sort and
Clyde flipped the paper upside-down to create his new sign. The bottom of the sign,
comprising half the sheet of paper, reads "Underwear Alley" in black permanent
marker. The sign is attached to the front of the brick art gallery by twine and duct-
tape. The twine is attached to the top of the sign and wrapped around a flagpole
bracket. The silver duct-tape is applied to the top and bottom of the sign. Photograph
of "Underwear Alley" sign (Aug. 25, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with
Clyde (Aug. 25, 2010), supra note 2.
15. Id.
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noticeably not amused by the whole affair,16 initiated the complaint with
the city. Clyde applied for a COA and was denied.
Personal vendettas, private warrants, and theoretical debates on
the nature of art aside, at the heart of this matter is historic district
regulations and their tension with First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech. This Note examines the ongoing controversy in
Salisbury through the lens of a municipality's power to regulate matters
of speech and expression, taking into account both state and national
trends regarding such challenges to municipal regulations, the procedural
and policy considerations that underlie the regulations, and the bodies
through which they are enforced.
This Note is divided into six parts. First, it provides background
regarding Clyde, his decision to put underwear on display, and the
response of the local government and community to both the "Underwear
Alley" display itself and the sign directing passersby to the display. In
Part II, the Note describes the related litigation, including the criminal
complaint, subsequent trial, verdict, and community response. Next, in
Part III, the Note addresses the larger context of historic preservation and
aesthetic regulations. From there, the focus is narrowed to the authority
of municipal powers to create and regulate historic districts in North
Carolina, the nexus between Salisbury's Zoning Ordinance and Historic
Preservation Commission, and the adjudicatory and enforcement powers
of the municipality. Part IV presents an analysis of the case law
involving challenges to municipal aesthetic regulations, specifically
16. When I (the author) personally visited the display to take photographs, two
unidentified people appeared at the backdoor of Mr. Crum's gallery (at the end of
the alley) and asked me to leave. Their tone made it clear they were not appreciative
of the attention the display was receiving.
17. Salisbury's Land Development Ordinance gives any person the right to file
a written complaint whenever a violation is alleged to have occurred. SALISBURY,
N.C., LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 17, § 1 (2008), available at
http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/zoning/intro.html.
18. Minutes from Historic Preservation Commission for the City of Salisbury
Regular Meeting, at 10, Sept. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/2010 %2OMinutes/September92010%20(2).
pdf. Instead of pursuing any legal challenge, Clyde framed the same paper sign that
was denied a COA by the HPC and placed it back on the front of his gallery. He has
received no further complaints from the zoning administrator about the "new" sign.
Interview with Clyde (Nov. 1, 2010), supra note 4.
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those involving protest speech and historic districts, including a
discussion of where those challenges have succeeded or failed, and an
examination of the reasoning behind the courts' decisions. Part V
presents a comparison of successful and failed challenges of other
municipal aesthetic regulations to issues raised by Clyde's display. In
doing this, the discussion will address the present controversy more
broadly, and outside the constructs of Salisbury's municipal ordinances.
This Note concludes by returning to the Salisbury Historic Preservation
Commission's response to the underwear protest sign, arguing that the
controversy was wrongly decided, and explaining why the composition
and power structure of historic preservation commissions create risks of
arbitrary infringement of citizens' First Amendment rights.
I. THE CONTROVERSY
Clyde owns Off Main Art Gallery in the historic district of
downtown Salisbury, North Carolina.19 The controversy began in the
summer of 2010 and took several forms: Clyde's dispute with Mr. Crum
over ownership of the alley; Clyde's (and subsequently the State of
North Carolina's) dispute with Ms. Cave over the removal of the
underwear installed in protest of Mr. Crum's actions; and, finally, the
dispute between Clyde and Salisbury's Historic Preservation
Commission20 regarding the appropriateness of the "Underwear Alley"
sign.2 1 This Note is most concerned with the connection between the
message of the "Underwear Alley" display itself and the sign announcing
its existence. Specifically, whether regulation of the sign in any way
diminishes the message conveyed in the display and, if diminished,
whether the municipal regulation of the sign infringed upon Clyde's First
Amendment rights.
19. Interview with Clyde (Aug. 25, 2010), supra note 2.
20. This is not the first time Clyde has clashed with the City of Salisbury. His
Confederate Civil War Prison has been cited by the city for ordinance violations
concerning vegetative overgrowth. He has also voiced his complaints about drug-
trafficking that occurs in and around his home as well as the lights from a new
parking lot abutting his home that keep him awake at night. Interview with Clyde
(Aug. 25, 2010), supra note 2.
21. See Ford, Panel says no to Clyde's underwear sign, supra note 12.
606 [Vol. 9
Community response to the display and the surrounding
22 23
publicity varied from indignation to glowing support. Salisbury Post
reporter Emily Ford summed up the art community's response best when
she reported: "Some say the incident has fueled a deeply rooted division
that already existed in Salisbury's art community - a division not
between fine art and folk art or artists and hobbyists, but between those
who support Clyde and those who don't."2 4 The city and state were more
deliberate in their responses. The HPC conducted a hearing denying the
sign more than a month after the controversy began25 and Cave was
required to appear in Rowan County District Court to answer larceny
charges more than three months after the removal of the first underwear
26
display.
After the Historic Preservation Commission denied Clyde's
application for a Certificate of Appropriateness,27 he considered
28
appealing on procedural grounds, but ultimately decided to forego this
option. Instead, Clyde focused his energy on preparing for the criminal
trial against Cave. In private warrant court, the district court where this
trial was held, the state brings the case against a criminal defendant.
Much of the time, the state's case is based solely on the testimony of the
22. It has been reported by Clyde that Retired Superior Court Judge Larry G.
Ford said he would have the magistrate that approved the private warrant fired.
Interview with Clyde (Aug. 25, 2010), supra note 2.
23. Hall, Art, and news, is in the mind of the beholder, supra note 12.
24. Ford, More than underwear at heart of art discussions, supra note 12.
25. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18. According to the state statute,
the city has 180 days to conduct a hearing regarding local ordinances. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-400.9 (2009).
26. See Shelley Smith, In brief 'Not Guilty' of underwear theft, SALISBURY
PosT, Nov. 2, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/110210-
Underwear-qcd.
27. The Historic Preservation Commission requires Certificates of
Appropriateness for additions, alterations, and various other changes to historic
properties, including signs and art. See SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE
art. XVIII, § 18.09 (2008), available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us
/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html. Without a COA, the sign was in violation of the City's
Zoning Ordinance. In short, Clyde's sign was illegal.
28. Interview with Clyde (Nov. 1, 2010), supra note 4. However, the HPC
seemed to be on solid ground procedurally. One member abstained, another
considered not making a determination at all, but nothing irregular existed. Minutes
from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 8.
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person who swore out the warrant. Because of this peculiarity in North
Carolina law, and the tendency of these cases to devolve into a shouting
match, the court has colloquially come to be known, at least in Rowan
County, as "fight court."29
II. THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, IN BRIEF
On November 1, 2010, 30 Courtroom I in the Rowan County
courthouse bustled with the day-to-day matters of criminal court. The
assistant district attorney called the calendar, defense attorneys continued
clients' cases, some defendants entered pleas and others made first
appearances via video from the adjacent jail. Most of the conversation in
the lawyers' lounge centered on the next day's election, and few people
noticed Clyde, quietly sitting on the last row, folder in hand, watching
the methodical cogs of the justice system turn. Seated across the
courtroom, and a few rows on front of Clyde, was Anne Cave, the
director of the Rowan Arts Council, the woman accused of taking
Clyde's underwear. At the close of first appearances, the assistant district
attorney called the defendant, Ms. Cave, and Clyde, the state's only
witness, to the front of the courtroom. The underwear trial was
underway.
Clyde took the stand and recounted the events that caused him to
take out the private warrant. His story was more colorful than the
accounts in newspapers but had little factual variance. A fact noticeably
absent from media coverage but prominent in Clyde's testimony was the
purpose behind the initial underwear display - the initial display of the
single, white, men's size double-extra large Hanes briefs taped to the
window. Clyde testified he fashioned the display to protest an ownership
dispute between himself and the owner of another gallery adjacent to his
building, across the alley - the same alley that later became "Underwear
Alley.""
29. Interview with The Hon. Charlie Brown, Chief District Court Judge,
District 19-C in Salisbury, N.C. (Nov. 1, 2010).
30. The following account is taken from the author's own personal
observations of the courtroom and the proceedings that day. State of North Carolina
v. Anne Cave, No. 10-CR-54894 (N.C. Dist. 19C Nov. 1, 2010).
31. While the ownership dispute of the alley was ongoing, Clyde's neighbor
erected a gate, and decorated the alley with brick chips and vegetation. Clyde used to
608 [Vol. 9
Ms. Cave also testified. She admitted taking the briefs, saying
she did so because a high school intern at Mr. Crum's gallery
complained about being "creeped out" by the display, and had a
"meltdown" about the underwear one morning.32 Cave's testimony did
not go further to explain the intern's meltdown, but with no other facts to
establish the reason for the intern's reaction, it is unlikely for any
reasonable person, including a high school intern, to have a "meltdown"
after seeing new men's briefs taped to a window. Ms. Cave seemed to be
trying to establish a justification defense for the removal, but the
justification was unreasonable. Important for this discussion is the fact
that a prima facie case of larceny, that is, stealing underwear with no
defense, was established during the trial. In North Carolina, the
"essential elements of larceny are that defendant (1) took the property of
another and (2) carried it away (3) without the owner's consent (4) with
the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently." 33 During
trial, the following facts emerged from the Ms. Cave's testimony: (1) She
admitted to taking Clyde's briefs; (2) she admitted taking them back to
her own studio, where she did not initially know what to do with them;
(3) she admitted not having Clyde's consent to take the underwear,
consistent with the events that followed; and (4) she claimed to have
finally decided to decorate the underwear and write on them the phrase
"art brings us together." 34
In closing, defense counsel argued Ms. Cave's case on the basis
of three defenses. The first was that the underwear was a spite fence, and
she was justified in taking them down. The second justification defense
was that the underwear was damaging to the psyche of the intern. The
third was that there was a lack of intent to permanently deprive Clyde of
the briefs since she decorated the underwear and eventually planned on
returning them. The defendant's purpose in testifying was questionable,
and the closing argument provided no answer. Defense counsel, based on
park in the alley but could no longer gain access because of the gate. A subsequent
court order instructed the neighbor to remove the "improvements." Interview with
Clyde (Nov. 1, 2010), supra note 4.
32. See supra note 30.
33. State v. Lively, 351 S.E.2d 111, 113 (N.C. App. 1986) (discussing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-70). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14 - 72(a) (2010) (noting that
larceny of property valued under $1,000 is a Class 1 misdemeanor).
34. See supra note 30.
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his arguments, tried to highlight what many viewed as the absurdity and
pettiness of the issue. The visiting judge, Davidson County District Court
Judge Ron Penry, noticeably perplexed and somewhat annoyed by this
seemingly inconsequential squabble, offered no explanation and ended
the matter with a summary verdict: Not guilty.
Many times throughout the trial, laughter echoed through the
courtroom.36 The comedic nature of the trial escaped no one, including
the judge. The judge undoubtedly knew the state had satisfied each of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet the judge, who
again offered no explanation for the verdict, seemed to dismiss the matter
as de minimis.3 7 Whatever the judge's rationale or authority, his decision
had implications beyond the criminal trial. The defendant, as mentioned
earlier, was the director of the Rowan Arts Council, a body designed
"[t]o provide opportunities for Rowan County organizations, individuals,
and activities that advocate arts and culture."38 The Council receives
35. For more information on the trial, see Shelley Smith, In brief 'Not Guilty'
of underwear theft, supra note 26.
36. A few examples of the sound-bite friendly trial: (1) Clyde testified that the
defendant "Told me I should be spanked." (2) In response to a question on cross-
examination about the monetary value of the briefs taken, Clyde answered, "They're
priceless, sir." (3) The defendant, claiming to have attempted to contact Clyde about
the offensive briefs, testified "I left three messages on his telephone and when I went
to his house, I was attacked by his chicken!" (4) Ms. Cave testified that after a
heated telephone conversation with Clyde following the underwear removal, and
after she told him that she would not return the briefs, he responded that he would
put "fifty rubbers on the window." Notes from Courtroom, supra note 4.
37. While noticeably absent from the criminal law code in North Carolina, the
concept of de minimis does exist in civil trials, where the court can dismiss "an
action based upon a wrong which constitutes only a trifling invasion of the plaintiffs'
rights or results in only trifling damage." Mosley v. Nat'l Fin. Co., Inc., 243 S.E.2d
145, 148 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (overruled on other grounds). Because of the wide
discretion exercised by trial judges, and the fact that the state is barred from
appealing these acquittals, the de minimis "tool" is effective in criminal trials even
though it is not often used. De minimis acquittals, however, are beyond the scope of
this Note. For more on the de minimis "defense," see Douglas Husak, The De
Minimis "Defense" to Criminal Liability (Nov. 20, 2009) (paper presented at
workshop sponsored by the Kadish Center for Morality, Law & Public Affairs,
University of California-Berkeley School of Law), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/DeMinimis2 DHusak.pdf.
38. Rowan Arts Council, Mission & Goals,
http://www.rowanarts.org/missiongoals.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
funding from the State of North Carolina to promote the arts throughout
the county.3 The acquittal on a larceny charge from the director of an
arts council with funding from the State because she disagreed with the
content of the art, calling it "offensive, is concerning, especially since
the council is tasked with dispersing state funding to promote the arts. It
is unclear whether Ms. Cave was acting in her official capacity as
director at the time of the taking; had she been, it would raise the
question of whether this rises to the level of the state censoring art on the
basis of content. Whether a state-funded organization is constitutionally
permitted to take down a piece of art for legitimate reasons is very much
in doubt, and is the focus of much of the remainder of this Note. What
seems unquestionably unconstitutional is the organization's director
removing a piece of art for illegitimate reasons; this is particularly
pertinent to the Salisbury incident if the director indeed was acting in her
official capacity.
III. THE POWER TO REGULATE
In 1966 Congress enacted the National Historic Preservation
Act41 and created a procedure through which historic sites could be
designated and granted protection from detrimental action including, but
42
not limited to, alterations and demolition. In 1989 North Carolina
enacted similar legislation 43 and extended to municipalities44 the power
not only to protect historic districts and sites from governmental action
but also to protect these sites from private action.45 The state statute does
39. Rowan Arts Council, Grassroot Grants Program,
http://www.rowanarts.org/grants grassroots.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
40. See supra note 30.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006).
42. Id.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-400.1 to 400.14 (2009).
44. The term "municipality" is defined to include both cities and counties.
§ 160A-400.2.
45. §160A-400.1. The statute reads:
The historical heritage of our State is one of our most valued
and important assets. The conservation and preservation of
historic districts and landmarks stabilize and increase property
values in their areas and strengthen the overall economy of the
State. This Part authorizes cities and counties of the State
6112011] HISTORIC PRESER VA TION
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not grant unfettered discretion to local bodies, and other sections of this
same chapter give local bodies a guideline for historic preservation and
46
regulation. Historic districts act as a kind of supplement to a
municipality's extant zoning ordinances,4 7  providing additional
substantive and procedural regulations to those zoning requirements. 48In
order to gain this additional municipal control in North Carolina,
establishment of a Historic Preservation Commission 4 9 is required by
statute; the statute reads in pertinent part:
Before it may designate one or more landmarks or
historic districts, a municipality shall establish or
designate a historic preservation commission. The
municipal governing board shall determine the
number of the members of the commission, which
shall be at least three, and the length of their terms,
which shall be no greater than four years. A
majority of the members of such a commission
shall have demonstrated special interest,
experience, or education in history, architecture,
archaeology, or related fields. All the members
shall reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the
municipality as established pursuant to G.S. 160A-
within their respective zoning jurisdictions and by means of
listing, regulation, and acquisition:
(1) To safeguard the heritage of the city or county by
preserving any district or landmark therein that embodies
important elements of its culture, history, architectural history,
or prehistory; and
(2) To promote the use and conservation of such district or
landmark for the education, pleasure and enrichment of the
residents of the city or county and the State as a whole.
Id.
46. See §160A.
47. Municipalities are authorized to establish zoning ordinances by N.C. GEN.
STAT. §160A-381 (2009).
48. 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 19:4 (4th ed. 2010).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § l60A-400.7 (2009).
612 [Vol. 9
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360. The commission may appoint advisory bodies
and committees as appropriate.so
The statute does not require a HPC to be formed, and it is not the
only type of body permitted by statute; however, it is the one adopted by
the City of Salisbury, and the focus of this Note.5 1 Within its
jurisdiction,52 the Commission has the power to designate historic
properties and districts, purchase property, conduct educational
programs, and negotiate with owners.5 3 This Note is concerned with the
Commission's additional powers to "[r]estore, preserve and operate
historic properties"5 4 and "[r]eview and act upon proposals for
alterations, demolitions, or new construction within historic districts."5 5
Much of the commission's authority is exercised through the issuance or
denial of certificates of appropriateness for alterations planned on any
historic property. 5 6The statute regarding COA reads in pertinent part:
From and after the designation of a landmark or a
historic district, no exterior portion of any building
or other structure (including masonry walls, fences,
light fixtures, steps and pavement, or other
appurtenant features), nor above-ground utility
structure nor any type of outdoor advertising sign
shall be erected, altered, restored, moved, or
demolished on such landmark or within such
district until after an application for a certificate of
appropriateness as to exterior features has been
submitted to and approved by the preservation
commission. The municipality shall require such a
certificate to be issued by the commission prior to
the issuance of a building permit or other permit
50. Id.
51. SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVI, § 18.06 (2008),
available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html.
52. "[The Salisbury HPC's jurisdiction] include[s] the City of Salisbury and
the extraterritorial jurisdiction area of the city as shown on the official zoning map
and atlas of the city." Id. at § 18.05.





FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
granted for the purposes of constructing, altering,
moving, or demolishing structures, which
certificate may be issued subject to reasonable
conditions necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Part. A certificate of appropriateness shall be
required whether or not a building or other permit
is required.57
The statute also requires municipalities to establish guidelines by
which to judge the appropriateness of alterations and rules and
procedures for determining issuance or denials of COA, including
hearings and appeals procedures.s5
As mentioned previously, the designation of historic districts
supplements the extant municipal zoning ordinances; this scheme is in
operation in Salisbury. Therefore, enforcement of HPC decisions,
including denials of COA, occurs through the city's zoning
administrator. 5 9 In effect, violation of HPC decisions is no different than
violation of any zoning ordinance violation, and the Salisbury Zoning
Ordinance authorizes civil penalties of up to $250 per day, misdemeanor
criminal conviction and accompanying fine, as well as equitable,
injunctive, and abatement relief.60 Violation of zoning ordinances is
important for this discussion, but more important is the power of the
HPC to regulate signs to further its goal of historic preservation, and the
broader municipal power to regulate aesthetics in promotion of the
general welfare.6 1 Historic preservation, in general, is on solid footing
since the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Penn
Central Transportation Company v. City of New York.62 Regulation of
aesthetics outside the context of historic preservation, on the other hand,
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVIII, § 18.15(3)
(2008), available at
http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/Im&d/zoning/ordinance/articlel 8.pdf.
60. SALISBURY, N.C., LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 17, § 3 (2008),
available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/zoning/intro.html.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-381 (2009).
62. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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has taken a more laborious route to recognition;6' as a result, its footing
is less firm.
A. Historic Preservation is a Permissible Governmental Purpose: Penn
Central Transportation Company v. City of New York
Penn Central Transportation Company owned Grand Central
Terminal in New York City, which was designated as a "landmark site"
and contracted to have a multi-story office complex built atop the
terminal. After being denied permission to go forward with the
building, Penn Central challenged New York's Landmark Preservation
Law, arguing that the designation of Grand Central as a landmark site
65
was a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
denying Penn Central's claim, the Court unequivocally endorsed historic
preservation as a valid governmental purpose, saying, "States and cities
may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life
by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city ...
preserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or
cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental goal."66
However ringing the Court's endorsement of historic preservation as a
permissible governmental goal, Edward H. Ziegler is quick to clarify, in
Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning,67 that "these enactments
are still subject to a host of other legal limitations applicable to other use
controls: the fifth amendment prohibition against the 'taking' of private
property without just compensation and the first amendment freedom of
speech guarantees, to name only two." 68
63. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48, at § 16:2.
64. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
67. RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48.
68. Id. at § 19.3.
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B. Municipal Aesthetics Regulations Gaining Recognition
Municipal aesthetics regulations outside the context of historic
69
districts have developed much more slowly over the past century. First,
courts followed the "early-period doctrine," where regulation on the
basis of aesthetics was not recognized as a legitimate government
purpose.70 Courts in the "middle-period" began to recognize aesthetics as
a legitimate governmental factor as long as another, legitimate public
purpose was present. 7 1 Now, at least in a majority of jurisdictions, courts
follow the "modern doctrine," 72 where aesthetics is recognized as a
legitimate government purpose in its own right. North Carolina, after
State v. Jones,73 joined the majority of jurisdictions in adopting the
"modern doctrine." However, the North Carolina Supreme Court was
careful not to "grant blanket approval of all regulatory schemes based
upon aesthetic considerations" 74 and adopted a balancing test, saying,
"the diminution in value of an individual's property should be balanced
against the corresponding gain to the public from such regulation. "75 In
addition to the fact that the court instituted this test instead of expressly
allowing aesthetic regulations carte blanche, it is important to note that
this case arose from a conviction for violating a statute requiring a fence
76
to be erected around a junkyard. It seems that even though the court
explicitly endorsed the "modem view" of aesthetic regulation, it applied
the middle-view, allowing aesthetic regulation when another legitimate
public purpose, namely, abating a nuisance, was present. Therefore the
"modern view," at least in North Carolina, amounts to a balancing of the
reasonableness of the regulation,n which seems to make it susceptible to
a challenge when the infringement of a fundamental First Amendment
right is involved. Whatever view the North Carolina Supreme Court
69. For a more in-depth summary, see RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48,
at § 16:2.
70. Id at § 16:3.
71. Id. at § 16:4.
72. Id. at § 16:5.
73. 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982).
74. Id. at 681.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 676.
77. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48, at § 16:6.
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adopted regarding aesthetic regulation outside the context of historic
districts, it is on less firm footing than the United States Supreme Court's
endorsement of historic preservation as a legitimate governmental goal.
C. Salisbury's Power to Regulate Aesthetics in Historic Districts
To distill the points previously made and apply them to the
controversy at hand, the City of Salisbury has a legitimate government
interest in regulation of aesthetics in the name of historic preservation. It
very likely also has a legitimate government interest in regulation on the
basis of aesthetics alone, both inside and outside historic districts, though
this latter interest is much less certain. Both of these interests, however,
are subject to legal and constitutional limitations and challenges; in the
Salisbury controversy, the First Amendment protections for freedom of
speech and expression may limit the enforceability of aesthetic
regulations even when they further a legitimate government interest.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS
First Amendment challenges to municipal regulations have been
78
mounted with varying success. Courts try to interpret ordinances and
regulations so as to avoid constitutional problems, and they have done so
in this arena by finding problems with standing,79 by finding that the
78. See, e.g., Burke v. City of Charleston, 139 F.3d 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing artist's constitutional challenge of historic preservation guidelines
because artist lacked standing); Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of
N.Y., No. 01 Civ. 1226 (DAB), 2004 WL 1982520, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004)
(finding Landmarks Preservation Law constitutional because it was "enacted for
purposes wholly unrelated to speech"). But see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (holding that municipal sign ordinance violated resident's free
speech rights); Bowden v. Town of Cary, _ F. Supp. 2d _, _, 2010 WL
5071613, at *15 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding that town's sign ordinance was
impermissibly content-based and unconstitutional as-applied to citizen's protest sign
painted on the front of his residence); Lusk v. Vill. of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480,
487 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding municipal sign ordinances unconstitutional as applied to
plaintiff).
79. Burke,139 F.3d at 403.
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80municipality's regulation was content-neutral, thereby triggering a
lower level of judicial scrutiny, or content-based, triggering strict
scrutiny,82 or by finding the municipal regulation to serve a valid
governmental purpose. Most applicable to the current controversy are
the following three cases in which courts have faced the issue of whether
municipal aesthetic regulations are permissible in the face of First
Amendment challenges to their validity: People v. Stover84 arose outside
the context of a historic district but involved a clothesline protest
strikingly similar to Clyde's; the United States Supreme Court weighed
in on municipal sign regulations in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, a case
which also arose outside the context of a historic district; and Lusk v.
Village of Cold Spring,86 a Second Circuit case that arose within a
historic district and addressed the precise controversy at issue in Clyde's
case - the balance of First Amendment rights and municipal aesthetic
regulations. Each case will be taken in turn.
A. People v. Stover
Stover arose out of a First and Fifth Amendment challenge to the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the erection of
clotheslines in front or side yards in the city of Rye, New York. Every
year that tax rates remained unchanged, the appellants in Stover protested
the tax assessments by erecting a clothesline in their yard from which
88
they hung, among other things, rags and underwear. The city passed the
ordinance after the sixth year of the Stovers' protest.89 In denying the
challenge, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that "reasonable
legislation designed to promote [aesthetics] is a valid and permissible
80. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of N.Y., No. 01
Civ. 1226 (DAB), 2003 WL 21767653 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003) (affirming denial of
summary judgment).
81. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001).
82. Town of Cary, F. Supp. 2d at _, 2010 WL 5071613, at *12.
83. People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276 (N.Y. 1963).
84. Id.
85. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
86. 475 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2007).
87. Stover, 191 N.E.2d at 273-74.
88. Id
89. Id. at 273.
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exercise of the police power." 90 In reaching its conclusion to the Fifth
Amendment challenge, the court quoted the language Justice Douglas
had used to explain the public purpose of using eminent domain to
eradicate blight in the majority opinion of Berman v. Parker:91
The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive.... The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.... If those who govern
the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
. 92in the way.
The court's denial of the Stovers' claim on First Amendment
freedom of speech grounds lacked the linguistic power of Justice
Douglas' Fifth Amendment argument. Instead, the court explained
"[a]lthough the city may not interfere with nonviolent speech, it may
proscribe conduct which incites to violence or works an injury on
property." 93 In doing this, the court seemed to be using the "middle-
period" aesthetics-plus test, concluding that the aesthetic regulation was
valid because it was coupled with economic concerns, and, it would
seem, crime-prevention concerns. The majority opinion went on to
explain that "the defendants were not privileged to violate [the
ordinance] by choosing to express their views in the altogether bizarre
manner which they did." 9 4 The court was noticeably disdainful of the
petitioner's clothesline, saying "[i]t is obvious that the value of their
'protest' lay not in its message but in its offensiveness."9 5
90. Id. at 275.
91. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). As part of an urban redevelopment project,
Washington, D.C. sought to condemn a non-blighted piece of property within a
larger area that Congress had determined to be blighted. Id. at 28-31.
92. Stover, 191 N.E.2d at 275 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33).
93. Id. at 276.
94. Id. at 277.
95. Id.
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The dissent espoused more concern for the petitioner's rights,
both in the realm of private property and freedom of speech, and used
language equally as powerful as Justice Douglas in Berman, and
especially relevant to the controversy at hand, stating:
This ordinance is unrelated to the public safety,
health, morals or welfare except insofar as it
compels conformity to what the neighbors like to
look at. Zoning, important as it is within limits, is
too rapidly becoming a legalized device to prevent
property owners from doing whatever their
neighbors dislike. Protection of minority rights is
as essential to democracy as majority vote. In our
age of conformity it is still not possible for all to be
exactly alike, nor is it the instinct of our law to
compel uniformity wherever diversity may offend
the sensibilities of those who cast the largest
numbers of votes in municipal elections. The right
to be different has its place in this country. The
United States has drawn strength from differences
among its people in taste, experience,
temperament, ideas, and ambitions as well as from
differences in race, national or religious
background. Even where the use of property is
bizarre, unsuitable or obstreperous it is not to be
curtailed in the absence of overriding reasons of
public policy. The security and repose which come
from protection of the right to be different in matter
of aesthetics, taste, thought, expression and within
limits in conduct are not to be cast aside without
violating constitutional privileges and immunities.
This is not merely a matter of legislative policy, at
whatever level. In my view, this pertains to
96
individual rights protected by the Constitution.
The dissent went on to foreshadow the seemingly endless ways
aesthetic reasons could be used to espouse the views of the majority, at
the expense of minority rights. It concluded with a conciliatory approach
96. Id. at 278 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
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to aesthetics and zoning, saying "that extensions of categories of local
legislation for purely aesthetic purposes should be defined and limited,
and, if they are to be enlarged, it should not be under reasoning which
sets no ascertainable bounds to what can be done or attempted under this
power." 97
The majority's opinion, at least on First Amendment freedom of
speech grounds, seemed overly infected with personal opinion as to the
tastefulness of the protest sign in question, going so far as to allude to its
propensity to incite violence. The dissent supported an approach
recognizing the fundamental rights at issue in matters of speech and
property and argued that any municipality infringing on these rights is
well advised to do so with caution. The two views in Stover highlight the
tension apparent when aesthetic interests of a municipality conflict with
personal rights of the municipality's citizens. The United States Supreme
Court finally determined that the tension was too great and decided to
weigh in on the matter in the case that follows.
B. City ofLadue v. Gilleo
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,9 the Supreme Court was asked to
consider the constitutionality of a municipal ban on all residential signs
that did not fall into one of ten exceptions.9 9 Gilleo erected several signs
at her residence protesting United States involvement in the Persian Gulf
War. 00 After the city claimed the signs were in violation of a city
ordinance and denied Gilleo's petition for a variance, Gilleo challenged
the ordinance as a violation of her First Amendment right to free
speech.10' In affirming the lower courts' determination that the
enforcement of the ordinance did in fact violate Gilleo's First
Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
city's interest in minimizing visual clutter and its ability to promote
97. Id. at 279.
98. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
99. See id. Examples of exceptions to the blanket sign prohibition mentioned
in the Court's opinion include for sale and for rent signs, on-site commercial and
organization signs, and signs warning of danger. Id. at 52.
100. Id. at 45.
101. Id. at 45-46.
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aesthetics through the police power.102 However, the Court found that
this interest was overcome by the residents' interest in free speech
through erecting signs on their own property. 03 The Court reasoned that
the ordinance nearly prohibited an entire form of communication that did
not have an adequate alternative, explaining: "Residential signs are an
unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for
persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may
have no practical substitute."1 04 The Court also noted:
A special respect for individual liberty in the home
has long been part of our culture and our law....
Most Americans would be understandably
dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was
illegal to display from their window an 8- by 11-
inch sign expressing their political views. 05
At the end of the Court's opinion, it addressed the argument that
the ban on residential signs is permissible because of the city's interest in
maximizing real estate values by reasoning that a resident's self-interest
in maintaining property values adequately addresses the city's
concerns.106 The Court also took issue with the total ban on residential
signs by saying "more temperate measures could in large part satisfy
Ladue's stated regulatory needs without harm to the First Amendment
rights of its citizens.,,1
0 7
Gilleo, although involving regulation of property in a residential,
non-historic district, is important to this analysis because the Court
discussed the type of sign at issue in the Salisbury incident, including the
size of the sign and material used to create it. The Court took special
issue with the fact that the city was completely banning such an
innocuous sign and infringing on the First Amendment rights of its
citizens to protest the government, where those rights are at their zenith,
in the name of minimizing visual clutter. The next case relies heavily on
102. Id. at 58.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 57.




Gilleo in applying these principles to residential historic district
properties.
C. Lusk v. Village of Cold Spring
Lusk v. Village of Cold Springlos arose out of a First Amendment
free speech challenge to the Village of Cold Spring's municipal
ordinances; the ordinances restricted Lusk from displaying protest signs
outside his historic district residence without a permit.109 On several
occasions, Lusk used spray painted plywood signs to protest the Village
for allowing construction to proceed on a waterfront condominium."o
The city issued Lusk a "Violation Notice" charging him with two counts
of violating a municipal code that made it "unlawful for any owner or
person occupying property located within the [Historic] District to
[m]ake, permit or maintain any alteration to any improvement located
within the District unless the Historic District Review Board has
previously issued a Certificate of Economic Hardship or a Certificate of
Appropriateness." The violation also alleged posting signs without
review by the Planning Board and an allegation that the aggregate size of
all the signs was too big.11 2 Chapter 64 of the Village ordinances gives
the review board the power to grant or deny applications for COA based
on factors including "general design... scale in relation to the property
... texture and materials . . . visual compatibility . .. and the importance
of architectural or other features to the historic significance of the
property."ll 3 The Second Circuit addressed two questions arising in the
context of Chapter 64 of the Village of Cold Spring's historic district
regulations: first, whether the review board's approval period was an
invalid prior restraint on free speech; and second, whether the reviewing
standards pursuant to Chapter 64 were invalid as vesting too much
discretion in the review board.
The court reviewed the licensing scheme employed by the
village in regard to historic district certificates of appropriateness. It
108. 475 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2007).
109. Id. at 481.
110. Id. at 481-82.
111. Id. at 482.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 484 (citing COLD SPRING VILLAGE CODE § 64-7(A)(2)).
20111 HISTORIC PRESER VA TION 623
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
began by defining and analyzing the history and purpose of the courts'
disapproval of prior restraints, concluding that
Chapter 64 is constitutionally invalid. It is one of
the typical attributes of prior restraints - that
Chapter 64 acts to 'freeze' the speech of the
plaintiff and others like him who reside in the
Historic District and who wish to use signs to
convey message, 'at least for the time' it takes
them to obtain a COA . .. that we find to be at the
heart of the ordinance's invalidity.1 14
The court went on to discuss the Supreme Court's analysis in
Gilleo, ultimately concluding that the type of sign at issue in this case
was similar to the type in Gilleo, and that the village "'almost completely
foreclose[d] a venerable means of communication that is both unique and
important' . . . at least pending Review Board approval."'" 5 The court's
prior restraint analysis focused on the possibility of a criminal conviction
for violating the sign ordinance.116 The court seemed especially
concerned that the reason for speaking might pass while a citizen is
awaiting approval, effectively either prohibiting too much speech
altogether or putting the speaker at risk of committing a crime," 7 and
determined that the licensing scheme provided in Chapter 64 was
"constitutionally infirm."'
Unfortunately for the purposes of this Note, the court passed on
the second question of whether the Chapter 64 standards vested too much
discretion in the review board. Here the court took a quote from Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement,"l9 to began its analysis of the
restrictions at issue in Lusk, saying, "To curtail [the risk of suppressing a
certain viewpoint], a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow,
114. Id. at 487 (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976))
(citation omitted).
115. Id. at 491 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994))
(citation omitted).
116. Indeed, Lusk plead guilty to violating the municipal ordinance. Id. at 482-
83.
117. Id. at 492.
118. Id. at 493.
119. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."1 20 The
Lusk court continued by acknowledging that although the Chapter 64
reviewing standards could be used by a reviewing official to suppress a
message or messenger that he or she disagreed with,121 the statute was
equally amenable to a constitutional construction where subjective
factors were not impermissibly considered.122 From here, the court
"[h]appily" adopted the constitutional construction and avoided
overturning the Chapter 64 standards.123
The opinion ended by acknowledging the potential for abuse of
Chapter 64 standards and left "for another day the determination of
whether, in a particular case, the ordinance's approval authority has been
used improperly on the basis of the message rather than the medium."1 2 4
Although the pertinent question was indeed "left for another day," the
court was helpful in sharpening the focus of First Amendment challenges
to municipal historic district regulations. It seemed to suggest that these
challenges would succeed or fail based on the ability of the challenger to
prove not that an entire scheme was invalid (Lusk's answer to that
question was "no."), but that: (1) the reviewing standards allowed the
possibility of subjectivity; and (2) subjectivity was the motivating factor.
These are indeed high hurdles over which challengers must leap.
V. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE
SALISBURY INCIDENT
In order to analyze the applicability of the Salisbury controversy
to previous First Amendment challenges to municipal regulation, it is
first necessary to address the threshold matter of whether Clyde's
"Underwear Alley" protest had First Amendment protection, and
whether the sign directing passersby to the protest had similar First
Amendment protection. The first subsection will argue that "Underwear
Alley" was protected speech. From there, this section will analyze the
structure of the Salisbury Historic Preservation Commission (HPC) and
120. Lusk, 475 F.3d at 493.
121. Id. at 495.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 496.
124. Id
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the framework within which COA applications are made and either
issued or denied, including what factors the HPC is permitted to
consider. The focus will then shift to how the standards were applied in
Clyde's case, and whether there is any evidence of impermissible factors
being taken into account.
A. First Amendment Protection of "Underwear Alley" and
Accompanying Sign
Courts have recognized municipal interests in regulations
regarding both historic preservation and aesthetics, and these principles
rest of firm ground.125 However, the strength of these interests
diminishes depending on the strength of the competing interests, namely,
the constitutional rights of municipal citizens.126 It is therefore necessary
to first establish that "Underwear Alley" and its accompanying sign had
First Amendment free speech protections.
Initially cryptic about the purpose of the first underwear display
and the second installment, "Underwear Alley,"1 2 7 Clyde finally admitted
at triall28 that the underwear was taped to the window in protest of his
neighbor, Robert Crum, who claimed possession of the alley that
separated their art galleries.129 Although it seems fairly certain that the
display would have had First Amendment protection had it been solely a
125. See discussion supra Section Ill.
126. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48, at § 19:3.
127. The media naturally seized upon the dispute once Clyde pressed charges.
The controversy then sparked a debate as to what constitutes art. See, e.g., Ford,
More than underwear at heart of art discussions, supra note 12; Ford, Talks on art
coincide with play, latest escapade, supra note 12; Ford, Clyde channels Blackmer
display years ago, supra note 12; Hall, Art, and news, is in the mind of the beholder,
supra note 12. Clyde seemed happy to leave his true motives hidden. See Ford, More
than underwear at heart of art discussions, supra note 12; see also Morgan Fogarty,
Underwear Controversy in Salisbury: Art or Eye Sore?, Fox CHARLOTTE, Aug. 3,
2010, http://www.foxcharlotte.com/news/local/Underwear-Controversy-in-
Salisbury-Art-or-Eye-Sore-99912079.html.
128. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; discussion supra Section
11. There was never any civil litigation regarding the underwear. The only hearings
on the issue were the criminal trial and the HPC hearing where Clyde was denied a
COA. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
129. See Interview with Clyde (Aug. 25, 2010), supra note 2; Notes from
Courtroom, supra note 4.
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piece of art, 3 0 the fact that its primary purpose was to protest the actions
of his neighbor did not diminish the underwear's First Amendment
protection.' 3  The protest message does not have to be explicit to
maintain this protection considering Clyde's neighbor at whom the
underwear protest was directed (and anyone else familiar with their
dispute) would clearly understand the underwear's message.132
Since the display itself had First Amendment protection, it
follows that this protection extended to the sign announcing the display's
existence. The sign labeling and directing passersby to "Underwear
Alley" was as integral to the display as the underwear itself. Speaking
without an audience does not seem to be the protection the First
Amendment's drafters envisioned, and taking away the "Underwear
Alley" sign, as the HPC effectively did, is similar to allowing citizens to
speak, but not allowing those speakers to gather listeners.' 33
The HPC seized on the sign announcing the display's existence.
It is here that the municipal regulations began to come into tension with
Clyde's First Amendment right to send to his neighbor whatever
unpleasant message the underwear conveyed. Before this Note can
examine whether the HPC's denial of Clyde's COA violated his First
130. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
131. See, e.g., id. at 1001 (stating that the right to protest a speaker peaceably
has as much First Amendment protection as the right to engage in the speech in the
first place); see also Coal. To Protest Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of
Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v.
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Protest speech falls squarely within the
protection of the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and
assembly").
132. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (flag burning) ("In
deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to
bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.") (internal citation and
quotations omitted); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (student arm bands); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (sit-in
demonstration).
133. See Charles F. Gormly, Note, The United States Information Agency
Domestic Dissemination Ban: Arguments for Repeal, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 191,
209-10 (1995) (arguing that the United States was a driving force behind the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which extends freedom of expression to
include the right to have listeners and hearers).
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Amendment rights, it is necessary to review the structure of the HPC and
the parameters within which it operates.
B. Salisbury's Historic Preservation Commission
Salisbury's Historic Preservation Commission is appointed by
the city council and composed of nine city residents, at least five of
134
whom must demonstrate a special interest in history or preservation.
The Commission has the responsibility of, among other things,
designating historic districts and approving or denying certificates of
appropriateness.13 5 Salisbury's Historic Preservation Commission charter
has adopted the North Carolina statutory language regarding certificates
of appropriateness verbatim.' The following criteria were added for the
commission to consider in its evaluation of whether the proposed
alterations, additions, or demolitions are "congruous with the historic
aspects of the designated landmark or district" and, ultimately, whether a
certificate of appropriateness should be granted:137
(a) Building height. (b) Walls. (c) Proportion of
width to height of the total building fagade. (d)
Proportion, shape, positioning, location, pattern
and sizes of any elements of fenestration. (e)
Spacing of buildings, defined as the distance
between adjacent buildings. (f) Building materials.
(g) Surface textures. (h) Color. (i) Expression of
architectural detailing. (j) Roof shapes. (k) Scale.
134. The ordinance establishing the HPC reads in part:
The Commission shall be a nine-member commission
appointed by the City Council. A majority of the members of
the commission shall have demonstrated special interest,
experience or education in history, architecture, archaeology or
related fields; and all the members shall reside within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Salisbury, the limits of
which are shown on the official zoning map or atlas of the City
of Salisbury, North Carolina.
SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVIII, § 18.06 (2008), available
at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html.
135. Id. at § 18.08.
136. Id. at § 18.09.
137. Id. at § 18.10.
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(1) Orientation of the building to the street. (in)
Ground cover or paving. (n) Signs. (o) Exterior
lighting and appurtenant features.
In addition to these criteria, the Salisbury ordinance references
design guidelines that the Commission must also take into
consideration.139 The design guidelines pertinent for this Note concern
both signs and art. The sign guidelines read in pertinent part:14 0
2. Signs should be compatible with the
architectural character of the building in size, scale,
138. Id.
139. Id. at § 18.07; see also Historic Preservation,
http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/historic/historic.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2011). The historic preservation website provides links to Salisbury's residential and
non-residential design guidelines. Id.
140. The omitted parts of the sign guideline read:
1. Retain and preserve signage that is original or is important
in defining the overall historic character of a building . . . . 4.
Whether they are wall-mounted, freestanding, affixed to
awnings, or placed on the sidewalk, signs should be placed in
locations that do not obscure any historic architectural features
of the building or obstruct any views or vistas of Salisbury's
historic downtown. . . . 6. Wall-mounted signs on friezes,
lintels, spandrels, and fascias over storefront windows should
be of an appropriate size and fit within these surfaces 7.
Projecting signs: Should be carefully designed to reflect the
character of the building and be compatible with other adjacent
signage. Should have visually appealing elements such as
shapes, painted or applied letters; two or three dimensional
icons, etc. should be considered. Mounting hardware should be
an attractive and integral part of the sign design. May be
constructed of a variety of materials including wood, metal,
appropriate plastics and composites. 8. Install freestanding
signs appropriately, such as on well-landscaped ground bases
or low standards. 9. Signs illuminated from within are
generally not appropriate. Lighting for externally illuminated
signs should be simple and unobtrusive and should not obscure
the content of the sign or the building fagade.




materials and style. If possible, base new sign
designs on historic documentation such as old
photographs. 3. Use traditional materials
commonly found on turn-of-the-century
commercial buildings such as wood, metal, or
stone or use modern materials that have the
appearance of traditional . . . . 5. Wall signs should
be flush-mounted on flat surfaces and done in such
a way that does not destroy or conceal architectural
features or details. 141
The relevant art guidelines read in pertinent part: "Location: 1.
Artwork should be appropriately-scaled for the intended space. 2.
Landscaping, seating, interpretive signage and other improvements to
enhance the setting and the viewing experience are encouraged . . . .
Materials: 5. Durable materials intended for exterior application should
be used."1 4 2
The Salisbury HPC Guidelines are strikingly similar to the
Chapter 64 standards at issue in Lusk v. Village of Cold Spring,'43 with
one possible difference being that the relevant guidelines in Clyde's case
pertained to non-residential property, where it was unclear in Lusk
whether the Village of Cold Spring distinguished between residential and
non-residential guidelines.144 It is also important to note that unlike the
scheme at issue in Lusk, where civil and criminal penalties were assessed
as soon as the signs were erected, the Salisbury scheme for violation of
zoning ordinances does not take effect, at least civil and criminal
penalties do not begin to accrue, until a ruling by the HPC on an
application for COA has been made.145 It follows that the Salisbury
scheme is at least somewhat less suspect that the scheme at issue in Lusk.
14 1. Id.
142. Id. at 62.
143. 475 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2007).
144. Unlike the Village of Cold Spring, it is clear that HPC in Salisbury does
distinguish residential from non-residential properties in its guidelines. Compare
NON-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 53, 55, with City of Salisbury,
Residential Design Guidelines, http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d
/historic/intro.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
145. See discussion supra Section Ill.
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Regardless of the constitutionality of the scheme within which
the HPC operates, the HPC still retains discretion in interpreting the
guidelines similar to the Review Board's interpretation of the Chapter 64
standards in Lusk. The Second Circuit addressed the existence of
subjective review, and the possibility of abuse, in the review board's
procedures; but, where there were two possible interpretations of the
guidelines - one which rendered the guidelines constitutional and one
which rendered them unconstitutional - the court construed the
ordinance in favor of the Village and adopted the constitutional
interpretation.146 The court left open the possibility of future challenges
to the ordinance, noting that the determination of whether the standards
were interpreted in an impermissibly subjective manner would be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 147 The next section discusses
whether the HPC's analysis of Clyde's sign was impermissibly
subjective. 14 8
C. Was the Salisbury HPC's Review Impermissibly Subjective?
Assuming the guidelines are permissible 49 the Historic
Preservation Commission still has the discretion to determine how these
guidelines apply to Clyde's sign. To fall within the parameters of the
historic preservation ordinance, the city zoning administrator first had to
determine that Clyde's sign required a certificate of appropriateness.150 It
then falls on the HPC to decide whether or not the sign is "congruous
with the historic aspects of the designated landmark or district.""'
Though the historic preservation ordinance lists criteria to consider when
146 475 F.3d at 496; see discussion supra Part IV.C.
147. Lusk, 475 F.3d at 496.
148. There was mention that the Historic Preservation Commission may be
called upon to review the appropriateness of the art installment itself (the clothesline
of men's underwear along the alley) but the only mention of "Underwear Alley" was
when the city planner commented, "I don't think the City regulates clotheslines of
underwear." E-mail from Emily Ford, Reporter, SALISBURY POST, to 3. Graham
Corriher (Sept. 29, 2010, 14:08:47 EDT) (on file with author).
149. The guidelines must be assumed permissible in the Second Circuit after
Lusk. Of course, North Carolina is not bound by Second Circuit precedent.
150. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 8.
151. SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVIII, § 18.10 (2008),
available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html.
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determining appropriateness, the list is largely unhelpful because it
simply lists "signs," 52 as a factor that should be considered. Thus, it is
necessary to make this determination from the Historic Preservation
Commission's design guidelines for signs and art. 53
i. The Historic Preservation Commission's application of the design
guidelines
The first guideline requires original signage to be preserved and
does not apply to Clyde's case. The second guideline requires signs to be
"compatible with the architectural character of the building in size, scale,
materials and style." 54 The HPC seized upon this requirement during the
deliberation phase of Clyde's hearing.'" 5  One of the Historic
Commission members said the sign "can be evaluated by scale" 5 and
summarily decided the "scale is too small for the building." 57 She went
on say "the style is not in keeping with what is typically seen as an
informational size art-wise, or appropriateness for the building."' 58 It is
apparent that whether the scale is too small or too large, or whether the
style is or is not appropriate, are decisions that are completely within the
discretion of the HPC. The guidelines do not provide measurements
within which signs must fall, nor do they provide examples to guide the
HPC in determining what is too small, too large, or not in keeping with
what is typical. Despite the HPC deliberation on the basis of scale,159
scale was not mentioned in the motion to deny the sign.160 Instead, the
HPC focused on "materials," reasoning in its motion that the paper sign
152. Id.
153. NoN-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 55-56, 62-63.
154. Id. at 55.
155. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 9-10. HPC hearings give
interested parties the chance to testify under oath and give the public the chance to
speak out in support or opposition. Following this, the commission deliberates the
decision on the record before making motions to approve or deny requests.




160. Id. at 10.
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was not appropriate because it "[lacked] consistency with other
informational signs in the historic district."' 6 1
The HPC also focused on the third requirement, requiring use of
"traditional materials commonly found on turn-of-the-century
commercial buildings such as wood, metal, or stone . ... "62 Since the
sign was made out of paper, and not one of the three materials listed in
the requirement, the commission determined that "the proposed change is
not consistent with the requirement for permanent materials commonly
found in the historic districts."l 6 3 However, permanency is not a
requirement found in the guidelines. Prior to the hearing, the zoning
administrator ruled that the sign qualified as an "informational sign."
This is important because the only regulations beyond those found in the
design guidelines pertaining to "information signs" merely regulate size,
and Clyde's sign is within those guidelines. The HPC was aware that it
was making its decision about a sign,166 yet they seem to have either (1)
inferred a permanency requirement from the list of materials in guideline
three, or (2) incorporated the art guidelines - which require the use of
"durable materials intended for exterior applications" 67 - into their
decision about the sign; either is improper. The deliberation makes it
clear the commission disagreed as to why the sign's material was the
problem, but they all seemed to agree that material indeed was the
problem.
The fourth and fifth non-residential sign guidelines forbid signs
from obscuring "views and vistas of Salisbury's historic downtown"'6 9
or "[concealing] architectural features or details."170 The sign was placed
on the front of the gallery, and did not conceal anything of historical
importance, only a few bricks. Unless a half-dozen bricks are an
16 1. Id.
162. NON-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 55.
163. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 10.
164. Id. at 8.
165. See generally SALISBURY, N.C., LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 12
(2008), available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/zoninglordinance
/1 2_SignsLastAmend031511 .pdf.
166. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 10.
167. NoN-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 62.
168. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 10.
169. NON-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 55.
170. Id.
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unacceptable concealment of architectural features or details, Clyde's
sign is within these requirements. The rest of the guidelines are
inapplicable to Clyde's sign.
In addition to analyzing the sign guidelines as they apply to
Clyde's sign, and since the commission may have freely meshed the two,
it is necessary to consider the guidelines as they pertain to art.17 The
preamble to Salisbury's enumerated art guidelines provides:
Installation of art in downtown and other locally
designated historic districts creates focal points,
destinations and vitality in or near landscaped
areas, sidewalks, street medians, pocket plazas and
similar public spaces. The Confederate Monument
on West Innes Street and the mural on West Fisher
Street are examples of existing art that have
become downtown Salisbury landmarks. The
second example illustrates how blank walls or
surfaces can provide a suitable framework for
installation of artwork. Design review of art
installations in historic districts should be content-
neutral while ensuring that the overall scale,
durability of the piece and manner of installation
are compatible with the historic character of
downtown.172
The two examples mentioned are incredibly large pieces of
artwork and, thus, do not provide much guidance to the majority of
artists in Salisbury's art guild. "Fame," the Confederate Monument, is a
fourteen-foot tall bronze statue, constructed in 1909, of an angel holding
a wounded Confederate soldier.173 The mural on West Fisher Street
171. Id. at 62-63.
172. Id. at 62.
173. See ROWAN COUNTY, THEO. BUERBAUM'S SALISBURY,
http://www.co.rowan.nc.us/GOVERNMENT/Departments/PublicLibrary/HistoryRo
om/TheoBuerbaumsSalisbury/DowntownSalisburyStreetScenes/ConfederateMonum
ent/tabid/501/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) (depicting a photo of the
confederate monument that originally appeared in the Salisbury Post on May 10,
1909).
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depicts a street scene at the town square in Salisbury and is 6,000 square
feet in size, taking up the entire side of a large building. 174
How, exactly, these two examples assist a downtown artist's
decision about displaying much smaller works is unclear. The
enumerated art guidelines that follow are equally unhelpful. They
provide that the artwork should be "appropriately-scaled,"l 75 should
"avoid areas that are important to the overall design or architectural
rhythm of the building,"17 6 and should not "conceal or result in the
removal of character-defining details or features."1 7 7 As previously
mentioned, the art guidelines also note that the selected materials should
be "durable materials intended for exterior applications.',178 These
guidelines would be applicable if the HPC was reviewing the
appropriateness of "Underwear Alley" itself; since the artwork was not at
issue (the city has allowed it to remain), these guidelines should not have
been used to review the sign. However, they do provide support for the
existence of the sign in the first place. The second art guideline explicitly
encourages "signage and other improvements to enhance the setting and
the viewing experience [of the art]."' Clyde's "Underwear Alley" does
not conceal or remove anything of architectural significance, and
assuming it is appropriately scaled, it seems the protest piece itself would
likely receive a certificate of appropriateness if an application were
made. If the display itself is not objectionable, then it is difficult to argue
that a sign about the display that the guidelines explicitly encourage, and
that arguably does not violate any of the guidelines for signs discussed
above - at least as they are enumerated in the sign guidelines - is
objectionable.
174. Mark Wineka, Artists touch up downtown Salisbury mural, SALISBURY
POST, June 5, 2010, available at http://www.salisburypost.com/News/060510-mural-
w-pix (depicting a photo of the mural on West Fisher Street). Depicted in the mural
are more than 150 local people, id; found among them, ironically, wearing overalls
and standing behind a horse carriage, is Clyde. Telephone Interview with Clyde,
Owner and Operator, Off Main Art Gallery and the Salisbury Confederate Civil War
Prison (Sept. 29, 2010).
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ii. Are the HPC reviewing criteria permissibly narrow, objective, and
definite?
The Second Circuit in Lusk stated that content-neutral aesthetics
regulations, like the Salisbury Design Guidelines, must be "narrow,
objective, and definite" to prevent a reviewing authority from
impermissibly infringing on First Amendment rights.'so The criteria for
signs in the ordinance for the HPC states that signs must be "congruous
with the historic aspects of the designated landmark or district."
Included in this are the Salisbury Non-Residential Design Guidelines for
signs used to analyze Clyde's denial of a Certificate of
Appropriateness.182 As previously mentioned, the HPC seized upon the
scale and materials of the sign in deliberating on and eventually denying
the certificate of appropriateness. 183 The only criteria in the sign
guidelines relating to the scale of a sign is that it be compatible with the
building,184 and the only criteria regarding materials is that they be
"found on turn-of-the-century commercial buildings such as wood,
metal, or stone."' 85 That the scale of a sign should be appropriate to
qualify for a certificate of appropriateness is completely subjective
without further guidance and neither narrow, objective, nor definite.
Additionally, the commission seems to presuppose that the mention of
"wood, metal, or stone" in the guidelines implies that sign materials must
be permanent, without considering that turn-of-the-century commercial
buildings could have easily displayed paper signs. In this regard, the
commission is reading narrowness, objectivity, and definiteness into the
guidelines to require "permanency" of materials. If the city wishes to
require that materials be permanent, it is free to adopt that language. It
has not.
180. See Lusk v. Vill. of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 494-95 (2d Cir. 2007);
SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVIII, § 18.10 (2008), available
at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html. The "narrow, objective, and
definite" requirement is binding. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 151 (1969).
181. PRESERVATION ORDINANCE, § 18.10.
182. See supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
183. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 10.
184. NON-RESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 55.
185. Id.
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Hidden within these overly broad, indefinite guidelines is the
possibility of subjectivity. For instance, the HPC could easily use scale
as a way to mask the content of the sign. Indeed, scale is generally used
as a guideline to prevent signs from being too large, whereas the HPC
suggested Clyde's sign was too small. The only unquestionably
objective guideline is the size of the HPC (nine members)18 and the
limits on the square footage of signs (and even here, the guidelines read
"generally").' 8 8 As the ordinance is written, the HPC has the power to
use scale and materials as the basis for regulating signs, and for that
matter art, without narrow, objective, and definite guidelines by which to
do so.
The Gilleo court made clear that it was unwilling to limit speech
in the interest of minimizing visual clutter.189 To be sure, the signs at
issue in Gilleo were in protest of the Persian Gulf War,190 a matter
overtly political, while the sign at issue in this controversy was erected in
protest of a dispute over access to an alley.191 While Gilleo's signs may
have more protection because of the nature of the protest, Clyde's sign
was also erected in peaceful protest and seems to have similar First
Amendment protection.192 Additionally, since the Salisbury sign
ordinances, unlike the City of Ladue's ordinance, do not completely
186. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 9.
187. SALISBURY, N.C., PRESERVATION ORDINANCE art. XVIII, § 18.06 (2008),
available at http://www.ci.salisbury.nc.us/lm&d/hpc/HPC.html.




189. City of Ladue v. Gillco, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1993).
190. Id. at 45.
191. See discussion supra Section II.
192. Courts have recognized that the First Amendment protects "protest"
speech. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1995) ("[O]ur constitutional
command of free speech and assembly is basic and fundamental and encompasses
peaceful social protest, so important to the preservation of the freedoms treasured in
a democratic society."); Coal. To Protest Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of
Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Protest speech falls squarely
within the protection of the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and
assembly.").
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restrict any certain form of expression, mounting a facial challengel 93 to
the ordinance as was done in Gilleo is likely to fail. Certainly, however,
the Salisbury HPC's determination that Clyde's sign did not meet the
requirements for a COA had the same effect on that particular sign as the
blanket ban in Gilleo had on the residential signs across the city. The
Gilleo Court specifically noted the importance of protecting residents'
First Amendment right to express their views through signs; the
recognition of this protection is relevant to the present controversy. 194
as-applied challenge to the denial of Clyde's COA may be successful in
light of the Court's analysis in Gilleo, particularly in light of the Court's
view of a sign as a form of speech.
iii. Balancing historic preservation with First Amendment rights.
Restricting Clyde from displaying a sign directing passersby to
his art installation infringes upon, at least to some degree, his First
Amendment right to free speech. Moreover, at trial, Clyde admitted that
the initial underwear display was a protest sign. His neighbor had
overtaken an alley, which Clyde believed his neighbor had no right to
possess. Clyde was upset with the obstructions placed in the alley and
was voicing his opinion on the matter. What the protest sign was
explicitly meant to imply is up for debate, but communicating with
underwear is unlikely to connote anything pleasant. It appears that
Clyde's initial display of the men's briefs does have some level of First
Amendment protection. The second "Underwear Alley" display had just
as much First Amendment protection as the initial display, as did the sign
announcing the display's existence.
193. Facial challenges attack the constitutional validity of the entire piece of
legislation, while as-applied challenges attack the constitutional validity as it has
been applied in a particular circumstance. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."). See also Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REv. 1321 (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court's treatment of facial and
as-applied constitutional challenges).
194. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 58 ("Most Americans would be understandably
dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their
window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their political views.").
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The trajectory of the case law seems to be toward applying a
balancing test on a case-by-case basis when First Amendment interests
conflict with municipal interests in historic preservation and aesthetics to
determine whether municipal ordinances are impermissibly subjective.'"
Clyde's interest in exercising his First Amendment right to display an
explanatory, or protest, sign is substantial. The interest of the city in
preserving its history, an interest that has been recognized by the courts
since Penn Central v. New York,196 while substantial in its own right, is
not unlimited. 197 Certainly Salisbury has an interest in ensuring that its
1820 Dr. Josephus Hall House' remains standing, or that the 1908
Train Stationl 99 does not fall into disrepair - but is the municipal interest
in preventing paper signs from being erected significant enough to
override Clyde's First Amendment rights? Seizing on this point during
the HPC hearing, Clyde inquired about the city not requiring others with
similar paper signs to obtain certificates of appropriateness.200 Nothing in
201
the record implies there was a response by the HPC.
An individual's First Amendment right to erect a sign on his
property seems paramount in this instance, and the events that followed
illustrate the city's lack of interest. After the initial denial by the HPC,
202
Clyde considered appealing on procedural grounds. For whatever
reason, Clyde decided to drop his appeal and construct a sign the HPC
203
could not deny. The sign he erected has yet to provoke any complaints
195. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48, at § 17:14. Additionally, the
Lusk court declined to decide the issue when faced with this tension. Lusk v. Vill. of
Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2007).
196. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
197. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 48, at § 19:3.
198. The Dr. Josephus Hall House is one of the Historic Salisbury
Foundation's premier sites. Information on the house is available on its website.
Historic Salisbury Foundation, Inc., Dr. Josephus Hall House,
http://www.historicsalisbury.org/hallhouse.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
199. See Historic Salisbury Foundation, Inc., 1908 Salisbury Railway
Passenger Station, http://www.historicsalisbury.org/depot.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2011).
200. Minutes from HPC Meeting, supra note 18, at 8.
201. Id.
202. Interview with Clyde (Aug 25, 2010), supra note 2.
203. Interview with Clyde (Nov. 1, 2010), supra note 4. The fact that Clyde
dropped his appeal is significant. A First Amendment challenge to a situation like
Clyde's could involve a significant amount of time and money in order to proceed
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from the HPC despite the fact that it is the exact same 8-by-i 1 inch sign
that had previously hung outside his door, except this time it is framed in
wood. 204
In light of these cases, it still remains uncertain to what degree
municipalities can restrict a person's First Amendment rights when
competing, legitimate interests in historic preservation conflict.
Instituting meaningful guidelines appears sufficient to be one possible
solution. The discussion that follows will analyze the value of
determining what guidelines are "narrow, objective, and definite,"
whether there can ever be guidelines to satisfy restricting First
Amendment rights, and what must be done when municipalities and
courts are faced with the challenge of balancing historic preservation
interests with the competing interests of free speech and artistic
expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Historic Preservation Guidelines for the City of Salisbury
have as their central focus the preservation of the architectural integrity
of historic buildings and historic districts. It is understandable that a city
would have a legitimate interest in preventing the destruction of or
destructive additions to the very buildings that comprise a city's history
and house historic events, historic people, and the aesthetics of a time
long since past. Destroying a city's oldest chapel to build a strip mall in
the name of progress is concerning, and few could successfully oppose
that argument. But denial of this innocuous sign is something different,
and more concerning. This is the type of arbitrary regulation that leads to
the disputes like the one at issue in this case.
The HPC seemed to decide that this sign or piece of art was not
pleasing and obnoxious, and that it should be taken down lest the city
suffer from a loss in tourism, or something equally concerning. Rather
than try and dispute the decision in court, the decision was allowed to
stand after Clyde dropped his procedural appeal. Yet Clyde did
with litigation. It is often those without means, the "starving artists," who are forced
to decide whether to try and enforce their rights in court, or accept the curtailment of
those rights by municipalities.
204. Interview with Clyde (Nov. 1, 2010), supra note 4.
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something that most would not - he challenged the city in his own,
unique way. He could have hired an attorney and challenged the removal
of the sign as a suppression of his First Amendment rights by the City of
Salisbury (or, although it is quite a stretch, challenged removal of the
initial display by the Rowan Arts Council in its capacity as a local actor
funded by the State of North Carolina). But this would have cost a lot of
money, with no guarantee of success. Instead Clyde, through a peculiar
and controversial system in its own right, utilized the resources of the
State of North Carolina and the power of the criminal law. While Clyde's
financial situation is not known to me, artists, as a group, are not known
for their abundance of means, and this seems an ingenious and
resourceful way to assert his rights. Unfortunately for Clyde, the
outcome of the criminal trial could very well forecast the outcome of a
constitutional challenge to the regulation.
As this Note has indicated, challenging the statutory scheme
through which the HPC makes its decisions would be difficult, and
unlikely to be undertaken by those most affected by its decisions. The
sheer number of design guidelines utilized by the HPC provide ample
opportunity to make a facially neutral arguments about its decisions to
approve or deny any particular sign or piece of art. The numerous
guidelines also provide the city with a legally defensible argument that
its guidelines are sufficiently "narrow, objective, and definite." Yet the
possible legal defensibility of the municipal scheme does not mean it is
one that has the interests of its citizens, or even the interest of protecting
its history, as its primary concern.
One possible step toward more protection of citizens' (especially
citizen-artists') rights is to reconfigure the structure of the commission.
The commission is an appointed body of nine members. These members
do not receive compensation and must display some interest in history,
architecture, or preservation. It is concerning that the commission is not
required to include members who represent the art community, a
community in which Salisbury prides itself, when the commission is
given the power to make decisions about signs and art and their
appropriateness. It is no surprise that the commission would find itself at
odds with an artist who takes pride in his singularity. The make-up of the
commission is important because the statute through which it operates is
broad enough to encompass an incredible range of matters, and, thus, the
commission is mainly limited by the matters it selects to regulate.
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More importantly, relying on the artists to challenge a system
wielding so much power is not a sound policy because many artists have
limited resources to bring claims and there are only a limited number of
artists who are affected. To prevent future infringement on First
Amendment rights, the city could also tailor its ordinances relating to the
HPC to make it more clear what the guidelines are designed to
encompass. For example, what are "traditional materials commonly
found on turn-of-the-century commercial buildings"? The examples
listed - wood, stone, and metal - do not provide reasons why others are
not allowed. Specifically, there is not an identifiable reason that paper is
not a material "traditionally found on turn-of-the-century commercial
buildings" other than the fact that it is not mentioned in the list of
examples. If the list is written to be exclusive, the ordinance needs to be
explicit about this point; if not, the HPC should be required to explain its
reasoning without reference to criteria, like permanency, not in the
language of the sign ordinance. Additionally, what exactly does it mean
to be "appropriately-scaled"? The guidelines need language more
meaningful so the HPC can effectively use them to make decisions that
are not arbitrary. It is not too much to ask that the ordinance provide
ratios or examples of what is or is not "appropriately-scaled" to guide the
commission's decision-making.
These are only a few examples of improvements that can aid in
striking the appropriate balance between citizens' rights and municipal
interest in historic preservation; there are undoubtedly many more. This
Note was designed to highlight an instance where these interests clash,
and what can be done to provide citizens more protection when voicing
their concerns while simultaneously recognizing that historic
preservation is a vital part of a city's identity. Historic Preservation
Commissions perform a noble and often unpopular task, and should be
given credit for their accomplishments. However, it is equally important
that they be held accountable when their decisions overstep their
constitutional bounds.
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